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Since 1999, 15 European countries have abandoned their national currency and autonomous mone-
tary policy, and have joined the euro area. According to the Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) theory, it is
more advantageous for regions to share the same currency area when there is a minimum level of
synchronisationofeconomiccyclesandintegrationoftradeandlabourmarkets.Despitetheincreased
economicintegrationamongeuro area countries, these have shownpersistent differentials. Benalalet
al. (2006) show that since the beginning of the euro area the dispersion of economic growth across
countries has not changed significantly, and remains at relatively low levels. Given that the level of
synchronisation of economic cycles has also increased, these differences suggest the existence of
structural differences among countries. A paper by the European Central Bank (ECB, 2003) on infla-
tion differentials has concluded that these are partly caused by convergence processes, but also by
otherstructuralfactors.Otherpaperspointoutoftheexistenceofdifferencesacrosscountriesinprice-
andwage-settingmechanisms(Dhyneet al., 2005;Dickenset al., 2006).
1 Eveninthecaseof common
shocks, these structural differences across countries may have implications on monetary policy trans-
mission mechanisms. Since monetary policy in the euro area is defined for the union as a whole, irre-
spective of country specificities or idiosyncratic shocks, what is the importance of heterogeneity at
union level? In particular, what is the impact on welfare of individual economies and of the union as a
whole?
This article addresses this matter from a broadly based and theoretical perspective, analysing the im-
pact on welfare when monetary policy responds to the union aggregated variables, given that there is
heterogeneityacross countries,namelyas regardsprice andwagerigidities.For that purpose,the arti-
cle develops a simple stochastic economy model with two countries forming a monetary union, where
the central bank defines the monetary policy according to a rule that reacts to the union aggregated
variables.
2 The model does not include government, given that its objective is related to the evaluation
of the impact of different heterogeneitysourceson a monetaryunion,not the interactionbetweenmon-
etary and fiscal policy. However, fiscal policy is acknowledged to alleviate or even eliminate the nega-
tive impact of asymmetric shocks or asymmetries across regions in the context of a monetary union
(Adão et al., 2006).
The article is in line with recent literature on dynamic general equilibrium stochastic models, applied
within a multi-country monetary union operating as a closed economy. In this context, it is worth men-
tioning the papers by Benigno (2004), Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) and Gomes (2004). Benigno (2004)
addresses optimal monetary policy in a monetary union subject to asymmetric shocks, and concludes
that an inflationtargetingpolicyin whicha higherweightis attachedto inflationin the regionwithhigher
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(1) In this respect, it is also worth mentioning the working papers developed in the context of the Inflation Persistence Network of the Eurosystem
(http://www.ecb.int/home/html/researcher_ipn.en.html). 221111111111 1
(2) This article is based on Soares (2008). 3nominal rigidity is nearly optimal. In turn, Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) compare two models estimated
for the euro area: one for the area as a whole and a multi-country model (Germany, France and Italy).
These authors conclude that there are significant welfare losses if the monetary authority does not
take into account region specificities when defining monetary policy. In turn, Gomes (2004) investi-
gates, based on an calibrated model, the implications of different price rigidity levels in a monetary un-
ion, in the presenceof specific and common shocks. She concludesthat idiosyncraticshocks and, to a
lesser extent, common shocks generate significant growth and inflation differentials across countries.
From the comparison of different monetary policy rules, she also concludes that the rules resulting in
the best outcome for the unionare not equivalentto the best result in individualterms. Rules withinter-
est rate smoothing actually stabilise inflation and output and narrow differentials across countries, but
reduce the inflation correlation among countries. Rules seeking to stabilise output actually reduce
output volatility to the detriment of inflation volatility and reduce the output correlation among
countries.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a summarised description of the model. Sec-
tion 3 presents the calibration for the reference case, which replicates a homogeneous union. In the
following sub-sections heterogeneity across countries is introduced, in order to analyse the impact on
welfare.The heterogeneitysourcesanalysedarethehomebiasonconsumptiongoods,andwageand
price rigidities. In this regard, it is worth stressing the significant impact of introducing heterogeneity in
wage and price nominal rigidities, wherefore this should be analysed in further detail through the as-
sessmentoftheinteractionbetweenbothtypesofrigidities.Section4presentsthemainconclusions.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
3
The monetary union is formed by two countries: the domestic economy (referred to as D) and the for-
eigneconomy(referredto asF). Totalpopulationintheareacomprisesacontinuumof identicalandin-
finitely lived agents and is normalised to 1. The relative size of the domestic economy is given by n,
wherefore() 1n is the size of the foreign economy. The economy includes three agents: households,
firms and the central bank. Each country’s economy operates in a similar manner. Hence, this section
describes the model of the economy in one of the countries, considering that the other one would be
similar.
Householdsconsume goods produced in both countries, save by investing in financial assets and pro-
vide differentiated labour to the firms producing in the country they live in. Households’ objective is to
maximisetheexpectedutilitydiscountedovertime.The representativehousehold’sinstantaneousutil-
ity is separable into consumption and labour, and depends positively on consumption less external
habit in consumption,
4 and negatively on working hours. Households are subject to two random
shocks: onepreferenceshock that influencespreferencebetweenhouseholds’current andfuture con-
sumption, and a labour supply shock that affects the availability of households to supply labour to
firms.
Consumption of the representative household consists in a basket of goods produced in both econo-
mies, according to their preference for domesticallyor externallyproduced goods (home bias). It is as-
sumed that Cj Dt , () is the consumption by the representative household j, resident in the home
economy, of domestically produced goods, Cj Ft , () is the consumption by the same household of
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(3) For further details on the model, see Soares (2008). 44
(4) This paper assumes the hypothesis of external habit, i.e. households take into account deviations of their consumption level from the per capita
consumption in the country in the previous period. Thus, consumption behaviour in the model seems to be more persistent and to respond gradually to
shocks, in line with empirical evidence (Abel, 1990, Fuhrer, 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003).goodsproducedintheforeigneconomy
5 and(denominatedthehomebiasparameter)istheshareof
domestically produced goods in total consumption. Therefore, the basket of goods consumed by


















When is equal to 0.5 there is no home bias, i.e. households do not show different preferences about
consuming domestic or imported goods. When  is lower than 0.5, households prefer to consume ex-
ternally produced goods; when it is higher than 0.5 they prefer domestically produced goods.
Households must observe the budget constraint to which they are subject. On the one hand, they re-
ceive income from labour and dividends from firms in the home country, given that the latter operate in
a monopolist competitive market. On the other hand, they may use their income for consumption and
saving. Households may thus trade in area wide riskless bonds and country-specific state-contingent
securities. Both financial markets shall be balanced at each moment.
Each household in the model supplies labour services to firms in the home country. Households can
only workin firms of their owncountry, since there is no labour mobility at the union level. Labour is dif-
ferentiated among households,whichoperate as labour suppliers under monopolistic competition and
set wages on the basis of their market power. In order to introduce friction in the wage-setting mecha-
nism, it is assumed that households cannot set in each period the wage enabling them to reach maxi-
mum utility level, taking into account labour demand by firms. Households can only optimise wages
occasionally, but donot knowinadvancewhentheycandoit. In eachperiod,everyhouseholdwillopti-
mise wages with probability () 1w
D 6. Thus, the parameter  w
D [,] 01, which is the same for every
householdand is constant over time, indicates the degree of wagerigidityof the economy:the closer it
is to 1, the greater the wage rigidity, given that the probability of optimising wages in each period is
lower. When households cannot optimise wages, they will adjust them partly in line with consumer
priceinflationinthehomecountryinthepreviousperiod.Inthoseperiodswhenhouseholdscannotde-
termine their wages, they will take into account the expected time span (given by11 /( ) w
D quarters,
considering quarterly model frequency) up to the subsequent optimisation. Therefore, the optimal
wage of the representative household will be defined as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitu-
tion betweenconsumption and labour expected over time. Aggregate wagein every quarter is proxied
by an average of optimum wage and adjusted wage, according to the indexing mechanism, weighed
by the share of households that have adjusted their wages in that quarter.
Using labour as the single productive factor, firms will produce differentiated goods, and will also be
subject to a random productivity shock. They are subject to fixed costs in production, which are com-
mon to all firms. Marginalcosts are given bynominalwageweighedbythe productivityfactor. Similarly
to wages, the price-setting mechanism also exhibits rigidity. Firms can only optimise prices at moment
t when they receive a random “signal” to do so, which occurs with probability () 1p
D . Therefore, with
probability  p
D , they cannot optimise prices at moment t, adjusting prices to a share of the producer
price index of the respective country in the previous period. Hence, parameter  p
D denotes price rigid-
ity, which will be the greatest, the closer to 1 the parameter is.
7 When firms may optimise prices, they
set the optimal price with a mark-up over marginal costs expected over time. Given that at each mo-
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Autumn 2008
159
(5) CDt , andCFt ,
F,trepresentaggregationinahomogeneousgood,duetotheexistenceofproductdifferentiationbothamongdomesticallyproducedgoodsand
among goods produced by the other economy. Households are willing to exchange between differentiated goods of the same country, according to the
elasticity of substitution. 6655555555
(6) The upper D index in the parameter means that this refers to the home economy. The F index is used for the foreign economy. 7
(7) Similarly to the degree of wage rigidity,  p
D ranges between zero and one, is equal for all firms and is constant over time. 877777777ment some firms do optimise prices whileother firms cannot do it, the price indexof goods producedin
either economyis proxiedbyan averageof the optimal price level and prices adjustedaccordingto the
indexing mechanism, weighed by the degree of price rigidity.
Sincehouseholdsconsumegoodsproducedineithercountry, theconsumerpriceindexisgivenbythe
averageof producerpriceindicesinthehomeandforeigneconomies,weighedbytheshareof domes-
tic goods consumption()  and imported goods consumption (1-). The index for the union will be the
average of the national indices weighed by the respective size of the country.
Considering that this is a monetary union model, the nominal exchange rate will always be equal to
one. As consumption goods are freely traded across countries, prices of the same goods are equal in
the home economy and in the foreign economy. The pricing-to-market hypothesis (Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1996; Betts and Devereux, 2000) is therefore not viable in this model.
Given that the model shows a significant degree of nonlinearities, a straightforward solution is not
available. Therefore, this paper follows literature and presents an analysis in terms of log-deviations
from the steady state.
8 The monetary policy rule is introduced ad-hoc and is not a result of the optimi-
sation programme. Followingthe extended use of Taylor rules in the literature, the central bank will re-
spondto inflationandoutputdeviationsfrom the steadystate, assumingthat the centralbanktargetfor
inflationis the steadystate level.The monetaryauthorityalsoshowsa preferencefor smoothingthe in-
terest-rate path. Moreover, the rule is widened so that the central bank may respond to short-term
changesininflationandoutput(SmetsandWouters,2003).Finally,thecentralbankisalsosubjecttoa
monetaryshock that maylead to surprises in the interest rate. Therefore, the monetarypolicyrule may
be expressed as follows:
 () (   )(  )( RR Y Rt R t y t t t y         	   	 	  		 11 1 


 )  YY m tt t  1 (2.2)
where  Rt ,  	t and  Yt are, respectively, the interest rate, inflation and output deviations from the steady
state in the area, and  m t is the monetary policy random shock.
The welfare function in either country is defined from the utility function of the representative house-




3.1. Calibration of the model for the reference case of a homogeneous union
At a first stage, the model is calibrated so as to replicate the case of a homogeneous union, i.e. coun-
tries have the same size, there is no home bias and the remainingparameters are equalfor both coun-
tries. Calibration is close to the results of estimated DSGE models for the euro area, e.g. the Smets
and Wouters (2003) model.
10
The intertemporal discount rate of households is calibrated so that the annual steady-state real inter-
est rate is close to 4%. Since it is assumed that there is no home bias in the reference case of a homo-
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(8) The log-linearised model equations are presented in appendix, where variables in terms of log-deviations from the steady state are given by ^. 9
(9) The welfare function is proxied by a second-order Taylor expansion of the household utility aggregation of each country. Welfare depends on the
steady-statewelfarelevels,namelyofconsumption,andonthedynamicsoftheeconomywhenrespondingtoshocks.Worthyofmentionasfactorswitha
bearing on welfare are price and wage inflation volatility, consumption and output volatility, and the interaction between output dynamics and the shocks
affecting the economy (except the monetary policy shock). 10
(10) Appendix 5.2 presents the values of the calibrated parameters. 11geneous union, the parameter  is calibrated to 0.5. The persistence of consumption is calibrated to
0.6, in line withthe estimation by Smets and Wouters (2003), but slightlybelowthe value estimated for
a smaller euro area model such as in Jondeauand Sahuc (2008).
11 The intertemporalelasticityof sub-
stitution of consumption is calibrated to around 0.7, in line with the hypothesis widely spread in real
business cycles literature of an elasticity ranging from 0.5 to 1. In turn, labour supply elasticity is cali-
bratedto around0.4. The degreeof wagerigidityis calibratedto 0.7, meaningthat, onaverage,house-
holds take 3 to 4 quarters to optimise wages. In those quarters when wages cannot be optimised,
these are adjusted by 75% of consumer price inflation in the previous period. In turn, the degree of
price rigidity is calibrated to 0.9, hence firms optimise their prices every 10 quarters, on average. Galí
et al. (2001)havealsoreacheda highvaluecloseto 0.9 for pricerigidityin the euroareawhenestimat-
ing a Phillips curve with constant returns to scale in the production function.
12 During those quarters
whenfirms donotoptimiseprices,theseareadjustedby50%of producerpriceinflationintheprevious
period. Therefore, according to Smets and Wouters’ results (2003), the model presents greater nomi-
nal rigidity in prices than in wages. The elasticity of labour demand is calibrated to 3, meaning that
wagemarkup is 1.5. Acalibratedvalueof 6 for price-elasticityof demandimpliesa price markup of 1.2,
whichis in linewiththe 1.1-1.4rangeusuallyacknowledgedin literature(Galí et al., 2001,Christianoet
al., 2005). The calibration used in the monetary policy rule is also in line with most literature. The inter-
est rate exhibits relatively high persistence, with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.8. The central bank
gives more weight to inflation deviations from target than to output deviations, which is in line with the
literature (1.7 weight on the rule for inflation and 0.1 for output). The weights of the differential compo-
nents of output and inflation on the monetary policy rule are also relatively low (0.15). The monetary
policy shock is not assumed to show persistence, given that the interest rate already has a high
persistencelevel.Preference,laboursupplyandproductivityshocksshowhighpersistence,according
to literature.
3.2. Monetary policy rules
This section examines the impact on welfare of the different rules that may be followed by the central
bank. For this purpose, the following string of rules was considered:
1. Original rule  .  .(. .  ). ( ). RR Y tt t t t t       08 0217 01 01 5 0 1 		 	  15 1 (  )  YY m tt t  
2. Rule without differential components()  	 

  y 0
3. Rule without interest rate smoothing()  R  0
4. Simple Taylor rule()   	 

   yR e 00
5. Low weight on inflation()  	  1
6. High weight on inflation()  	  2
7. No weight on the output gap()  y  0
8. High weight on the output gap()  y  1
The ruleoriginallydefinedinthemodel(rule1)issimilartothatestimatedinthemodelfortheeuroarea
by Smets and Wouters (2003). In rule 2, the central bank does not react to short-term developments in
inflation and output. Rule 3 evaluates the impact of the preference for smoothing the interest rate path.
If thereisnointerestratepersistence,theinflationandoutputtargetsmaybereachedfaster. Mostliter-
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(11) The calibrated value is also close to the value estimated for the USAin Christiano et al. (2005) 1211111111111111
(12) However, when compared to other estimations, namely for the USA, the assumption implies great price rigidity (Christiano et al., 2005). 1312121212121212ature considers as quite valid the hypothesis of interest rate smoothing, since less interest rate volatil-
itymaybedeemedimportantfor thewelfareof theeconomies.Moreover, theuncertaintyregardingthe
true model of the economy and the impact of shocks warrant a more cautious approach by central
banks (Martins, 2000). Asimple Taylor rule is also examined, which only reacts to inflation and output
deviations (rule 4).
Asecond string of rules evaluates the relative importance assigned by the central bank to inflation and
output stabilisation around the target (rules 5 to 8). The existence of a short-term trade-off between
output and inflation stabilisation justifies the analysis of the impact of this option of the central bank on
welfare. If the central bank responds to inflation and as a result the interest rate changes less than in-
flation, monetary policy may then contribute to generate more volatility in the economy (Clarida et al.,
2000). Therefore, 1 is the lowest value that the monetary authority is deemed to place on the inflation
weight on the rule. As higher values are placed on the inflation weight, the rule gradually allows for
sharper shock adjustment (Clarida et al., 2000). If the monetary authority places more relevance on
output stabilisation, then its relative weight on the rule is expected to increase.
The results for the different heterogeneitysources (see Charts 1, 2 and 3) showthat the comparison of
the different rules is not affected bythe rigiditysource considered.In anycase, rules witha higher rela-
tive weight on inflation, compared to their weight on the output gap generate better results in terms of
welfare in either country and at the union level. In turn, rules with relative higher weight on the output
gap lead to higher losses in terms of welfare, when compared to the other rules. In this model, rules
with a relatively higher weight on inflation are those that better stabilise this variable. This suggests
that, given the effects of the rules on welfare, inflation volatility is relevant for welfare levels. In effect,
the agents are deemed to assign high importance to inflation volatility in the welfare function. Inflation
volatility is also expected to affect consumption and production decisions by households and firms.
The comparison of the different rules is in line with most literature. Indeed, it seems to be consensual
that the central bank should react more strongly to inflation. Clarida et al. (1999) mention that, under
commitment,theoptimalpolicyleadsthecentralbankto respondmoreaggressivelyto inflationthanto
output.Gomes (2004)indicatesthat the policiesallowingfor greaterstabilisationof inflationarenot the
same inducing greater stabilisation of output around the steady-state level.
In turn, the group of policy rules that compare different rule structures (rules 1 to 4) leads to rather
close welfare levels, suggesting that the choice of the central bank among the different formulations is
not very relevant. If the central bank opts for smoothing the interest-rate path, welfaredeclines slightly.
However, this result may depend on the type and size of the main shocks in the economy.
3.3. Heterogeneity as regards the home bias
This sub-section introduces heterogeneity in the monetary union, by changing only one parameter
separately in the home economy vis-à-vis the reference calibration (section ). The first heterogeneity
source to be analysed is the home bias, where the foreign economy remains with no home bias
(* . )  05. The impact on welfarefrom changingthe home bias in the home economyis analysed,i.e.
the scenario when domestic households prefer to consume imported goods(. ) 05 and when they
prefer domestically produced goods(. ) 05. Chart 1 presents the main results.
Different levels of home bias across countries has impacts mainly on the steady-state welfare, since
thedynamicsof theeconomiesremainrelativelyunchanged.Whenthehomebiasis lowerinthehome
economy(. ) 05, preference for domestic goods and, therefore, demand for these goods are lower,
as wellas their production.Labourutilisationis thus lowerin domestic firms. In turn, firms in the foreign
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162economy increase production in response to higher demand for their goods and, as a result, the
amount of labour used increases. Given that labour elasticity is lower than consumption elasticity in
households, sharper changes are observed in consumption than in labour in each country. As a result
of the combined effect of the decline (increase) in labour and of the increase (decline) in consumption
in the home (foreign) economy in view of these lower levels in home bias in the home country, welfare
is slightlyhigherin the home economyand, in contrast, it is lowerin the foreign economy. However, the
best result in terms of welfare for the union and for either country is reached when the countries are
complementary as regards the home bias, i.e. when the overall preference of the union is similar for
goods of either country. This does not mean that the countries must be equal, but if the preference of
the home economyfor domestic goods is high, then the preference for domestic goods by households
in the other country should be low (i.e.   *1 ).
3.4. Heterogeneity as regards nominal rigidity
It canbeassumedthattheeconomiesmaydifferasregardsthedegreesofpriceandwagerigidity. The
analysisof the effect of this heterogeneitysource requires the parameters reflecting the rigiditydegree
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Chart 1
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Rule 8on wages  w
D and prices  p
D in the home economy to be changed separately. This type of differences
across countries in the union does not change the steady-state welfare, but has significant effects on
the dynamicsof the economies.Charts 2 and 3 present the results of the impact on welfareof changes
in the wage and price stickiness parameters, respectively, of the home economy.
In general, when rigidity is reduced in the home economy while it is high in the foreign economy, this
leads to a decline in welfarein either economy. This is chiefly due to the fact that more flexibilitygener-
ates more volatility, particularly of inflation, which deteriorates welfare. The more flexible country,
namely as regards price setting, tends to present a lower welfare level. It is also interesting to stress
some results in terms of heterogeneity as regards wage rigidity. On the one hand, whereas wages are
more flexible in one of the countries, the impact in terms of welfare is virtually nil. However, when the
parameter of wage rigidity is raised in one of the countries, especially above the level of price sticki-
ness, welfaredrops significantly. This meansthat, inadditionto heterogeneityat the unionlevel,the in-
teraction between price and wage rigidity also seems to be relevant for welfare. Therefore, this paper
also presents a more detailed analysis of these effects.
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Chart 2
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Rule 83.4.1. Interaction between price and wage rigidity
The analysis in this section is presented in two stages: first, considering that countries remain equal at
all times, the effects of changing nominal rigidity degrees is evaluated (Chart 4); at the second stage,
only the home economy parameters are changed, in order to evaluate the interaction between price
and wage rigidity (Chart 5). In either case, the monetary policy rule is maintained (following rule 1 and
thecentralbankkeepsonrespondingtotheaggregatedvariables,andtheothercountries’parameters
are kept unchanged. In addition, this analysis refers only to the effects on short-run dynamics of the
economies in response to shocks, given that, as previouslymentioned, changes in the nominal rigidity
parameters would not change the steady state.
Chart 4 shows that flexible wages and prices actually generate the best situation in terms of welfare
(point Ain the Chart). When countries start from the scenario of the most flexible prices and wages as
possible (panel (b) of Chart 4), increasing stickiness leads to a decline in welfare(moving from the left-
to the right-hand side of the Chart), which is all the more significant when only wage rigidity increases
whileprices remainflexible.In turn, whencountriesstart from the baselinescenarioof a highdegreeof
nominalrigidity(panel(a) of Chart 4), raisingthe overalldegreeof flexibilityof the economiesimproves
welfare, but decreasing only price rigidity while maintaining wages sticky deteriorates welfare. In this
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Chart 3
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Note: The degree of rigidity increases in tandem with its parameter value. In the foreign economy, the price rigidity parameter stands at 0.9.case, prices accommodate more the effect of shocks, and therefore inflation becomes more volatile,
given that adjustments via wages,whichremain sticky, are more time-consuming. This is the worstsit-
uation for households and firms. Hence, the main conclusions to be drawnfrom the interaction among
rigidity types with similar countries are the following: (i) more flexibility allows for higher welfare, (ii)
price flexibilityhas an impact on welfaremore significant, but (iii) a very high degree of price and wage
rigidity also translates into one of the best results in terms of welfare. In this case, prices and wages
react little to shocks and, as a result, they show very low volatility, which largely explains this result.
In an economy with sticky wages and flexible prices, firms may easily adjust prices to marginal costs.
However, households cannot optimise wages, but may update it to a quite high share (75%) of con-
sumer price inflation in the previous period. Ultimately, price developments are being determined by
past inflation, which is also the main determining factor of the central bank response. In turn, wages
take much longer to resume their optimal level, and monetary policy does not take into account their
development. Therefore, inflation volatility is rather high and, as a result, the welfare level is
considerably lower.
When heterogeneityis introducedacross countriesas regardsthe parameters reflectingnominalrigid-
ity, conclusions change slightly. Whereas in Chart 4 countries remain equal at all times, Chart 5 pres-
ents the results when nominal rigidity parameters in the home economy are changed, while in the
foreign economy the degree of nominal rigidity remains high (panel (a)) or very low (panel (b)). More
flexible economies continue to be the preferable situation in terms of welfare, but only when countries
are similar. If countries start from a situation of great flexibility and the rigidity degree increases in the
home economy(panel (b) of Chart 5), it can be seen that welfarein the foreign economyremains virtu-
ally unchanged, but welfare in the home economy drops considerably, more so when only wage sticki-
nessisraised.Inturn,if thestartingsituationisthebaselinescenario(section), inwhichbothcountries
showhighnominalrigidity, andif nominalrigidityparametersare changedin the homeeconomy(panel
(a) of Chart 5), then there are welfare losses for the union, although this does not imply that the situa-
tion deteriorates in both countries. In effect, if the home economy reduces overall rigidity, it may im-
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Chart 4
WELFARE LEVELS FOR DIFFERENT DEGREES OF NOMINAL RIGIDITY, MAINTAINING COUNTRIES EQUAL
AT ALL TIMES






















































Note: Each line corresponds to the union’s welfare according to the nominal rigidity parameter being changed in both economies at the same time. Chart (a) illustrates the case where,
whenonlyonerigiditysourcechanges,theothersourcemaintainsthebaselinecalibrationaccordingtowhicheconomiesaresticky.Chart(b)illustratesthecasewhere,whenonlyoneri-
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Chart 5
WELFARE LEVELS FOR DIFFERENT DEGREES OF NOMINAL RIGIDITY ON THE HOME ECONOMY
(a) Foreign economy is sticky and home economy
rigidity degrees change
(b) Both countries are flexible at the start










































































































































































































































































tion. That charts in column (b) illustrate the case where, when only one rigidity source in the home economy is changed, the other source maintains the calibration closer to the flexible
price/wage scenario, as well as the foreign economy calibration.prove welfare, but the situation deteriorates considerably in the foreign economy. The home economy
is able to adjust more quickly to shocks and the policy response will be more contained than if both
countries werevery rigid. This situation wouldhave a negative impact in the most rigid country. In turn,
when only one source of nominal rigidity is flexible, there are welfare losses, given that the economy
adjustment to shocks occurs via prices or wages, depending on which is more flexible, and via its im-
pact on activity. When the home economy only raises wageflexibility, the decline in the welfarelevel is
relatively low and similar across countries. However, when the home economy only reduces price
stickiness while wages remain rigid, then the welfare level drops in both countries, although more
markedlyin the home economy. In this case, inflation volatilityof the home economyis higher because
prices adjust more quickly to shocks, thus contributing to a substantial fall in welfare in this country.
The abovementionedstrongimpact onwelfareelapsingfrom the existenceof priceflexibilitywithwage
rigidity is again confirmed.
From the model analysis, it is possible to conclude that there is an incentive for coordinated policies
among the union member regions, which would foster price and wageflexibilisation.
3.5. Countries’ weight on the monetary policy rule
There is inliteraturesomepapersthat seekto evaluatecentralbankoptimalpolicyina monetaryunion
with heterogeneity across regions. Benigno (2004) suggests that the central bank should respond
more aggressively to inflation in the country with greater rigidity. Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) advance
arguments suggesting that central banks should take into account the specificities of the member
countries when defining monetary policy.
In this context, and evaluatingonlythe impact of simple rules,
13 one can inquirewhether, in the context
of this model, the central bank should consider the economic behaviour of each country instead of ex-
amining only the aggregate. It is assumed that the central bank follows the above rule 2 (Taylor rule
with interest rate smoothing), but instead of responding to the aggregated variables calculated from
the average of the individual variables weighed by country size, it may weigh inflation and output of
each country based on a different share, other than size. In this way, it would be interesting to know
which weight the central bank shall assign to each country, considering that these may be different in
terms of their nominal rigidity degrees.
The results of the model are in line with the main conclusions found in literature. When there is hetero-
geneity regarding the degree of nominal rigidity betweenthe union members, and considering that the
central bank can observe each country stickiness levels, then the central bank should respond more
strongly, relatively to countries’ size, to the macroeconomic variables of the more rigid country, since
that leads to a higher welfare level. For instance, Chart 6 shows that, in the case of low overall degree
of nominal rigidity in the home economy, the welfare of the union would be higher if the central bank
wouldweighinflation and output in this economywitha weightbelowthe real size of the country. In this
case, the adjustment to shocks in the home economy occurs more quickly, whereforethe central bank
may seek to contribute more to the stabilisation of the other economy, where this process is slower.
The central bank should follow this strategy when countries are different in just one of the two types of
rigidity or in both simultaneously. In most cases, this strategy has better results in terms of welfare for
the union and for individualcountries. It should be mentionedthat whencountries are more similar, the
weight of each country on the rule is closer to the country size and welfare gains due to a change in
weight are minimal.
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(13) Thisarticledoesnotpresentananalysisofoptimalpolicy.Galí(2002)mentionsthatsimplerulesareagoodproxytooptimalrulesand,inaddition,arebetter
understood by economic agents. 144. CONCLUSION
This articles presents an analysis of the effects on welfare from considering heterogeneity across
membercountriesinamonetaryunion,basedonatwo-countrysimpledynamicstochasticmodel.Het-
erogeneitysourcesconsideredarethehomebias,i.e. thepreferenceof householdsfor consumingdo-
mestically produced goods, and the price and wage rigidity degrees.
Some findings on the importance of heterogeneity in a monetary union are presented. As regards the
home bias, countries should preferably complement each other, since this wouldpermit them to reach
a higher welfare level. The analysis of heterogeneity as regards nominal rigidity degrees leads to the
following main conclusions:
14
• More flexibleeconomies lead to higher welfarefor the union, as long as countries are identical,
especially as regards nominal rigidity levels;
￿ Price flexibility with wage rigidity has a strong negative effect on welfare;
￿ Introducing heterogeneity in nominal rigidity degrees across countries in a monetary union
may have negative effects on welfare, justifying coordination among countries;
￿ If the central bank can observe country specificities, it should respond more aggressively to
deviations from target of the most rigid country.
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Autumn 2008
169
Chart 6
AREA WIDE WELFARE IN CASE OF CHANGES IN THE DEGREE OF OVERALL RIGIDITY IN THE HOME
ECONOMY AND IN THE WEIGHT OF THE HOME ECONOMY ON THE MONETARY POLICY RULE
(14) It should be recalled that these conclusions derive from the analysis of short-term dynamics of the economies in response to shocks considered in the
model, since different nominal rigidity levels do not change the steady state in this model. 15Nevertheless,itisimportanttorecallthatthesefindingsaretakenfromsimulationscarriedoutinasim-
ple model, not including capital or government. Therefore, with a view to enrich the study and under-
standingthe robustness of the results, a future research line could incorporatecapital and government
in the model, since the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy may ease or even elimi-
nate the negative effects of asymmetries or idiosyncratic shocks in a monetary union (Adão et al.,
2006).
Giventhe importanceof wagerigiditywhenpricesaresticky, thereis a possibilitythat labourmobilityat
the union level could alleviate such negative effects, given that firms may better adjust production ac-
cording to the specific shocks affecting the economies.
Finally, bringing the model closer to statistical data, another possible line of future research could be
the estimation of the model. FollowingPytlarczyk(2005),
15 one could assume that one of the countries
would be Portugal and the other would be the rest of the euro area. This would make it possible to in-
vestigate the possible structural differences and the effects of monetary union in Portugal.
5. APPENDIX
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(15) Pytlarczyk (2005) presents an estimated model for Germany and the rest of the euro area. 16WU C UC C
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Table 1
PARAMETER VALUES USED IN THE CALIBRATION AND SIMULATION OF THE MODEL IN HOMOGENEOUS
COUNTRIES (EQUAL PARAMETERS IN BOTH ECONOMIES)
Parameter Description Value
 Intertemporal discount factor 0.99
h Consumer persistence 0.6
 c Relative risk aversion coefficient on consumption 1.4
 Home bias 0.5
 L Relative risk aversion coefficient on labour supply 2.4
 w Wage indexation 0.75
 w Probability of not optimizing wages 0.7
 Labour demand elasticity 3
 p Price indexation 0.5
 p Probability of not optimizing prices 0.9
 Price elasticity 6
n Size of the home economy 0.5
 R Interest rate smoothing 0.8
 	 Weight of inflation on the monetary policy rule 1.7
 y Weight of the output gap 0.1
 	 
 Weight of the inflation differential 0.15
 
y Weight of the output differential 0.15
 b Persistence of the preference shock 0.85
 L Persistence of the labour supply shock 0.89
 a Persistence of the productivity shock 0.82
 m Persistence of the monetary policy shock 0
Size of the preference shock 0.4
Size of the labour supply shock 3
Size of the productivity shock 0.6
Size of the monetary policy shock 0.16. REFERENCES
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